Texas Attorney Blog

One of the things I love about being a Texas real estate and development lawyer is that Texans are so open to innovative real estate developments. Practicing real estate and development law in Texas is great fun and very satisfying for this reason. A recent real estate development in Texas illustrates the point: co-housing, while not invented in Texas, has come to Texas. As a recent article by Bob Moos in the Dallas Morning News online entitled "Co-Housing Catching On in U.S." explains, the first elder co-housing development in Texas is being built in Duncanville, Texas, called Wildflower Village.

The members of the Village have been meeting together over the past two years to get to know one another, and to design their community. Some arguments have occurred, but they also meet socially to have fun as well. They like to arrive at decisions by consensus, rather than a "majority rules" vote. The development is limited to adults over 50 years of age. They plan to individually own their own single-story home. However, they will collectively own a common building that will have a gourmet kitchen, dining room, living area, home theater, craft room and two guest bedrooms.

This is an incredible concept and I wish them all the best of luck. They have gotten to know each other before they even hired a builder or an architect, and so have created a community for themselves, meaning "community" in the sense of a village with neighbors and friends, not just buildings. For more information, visit their website.

A substantial part of my Texas real estate law practice over the past thirty years has involved Texas commercial real estate leases, representing both landlords and tenants (often representing either landlords or tenants who are based outside of Texas). An issue that frankly does not come up often is the timing of notices by one party or the other, or the timing of payments by the tenant to the landlord, in part because commercial lease language regarding the timing of notices or payments is generally clearly written. A recent Texas case by the Texas Eleventh Court of Appeals reiterates that the lease means what it says.

In the case of John B. Meadows, et al. v. Midland Super Block Joint Venture, the 11th Texas Court of Appeals held that when the lease in question required that a payment or a notice had to be delivered to the landlord by the first of the month, a payment or notice that was only mailed by the first of the month, and was received several days after the first, was insufficient, and the landlord's termination of the lease was proper.

The tenant argued that the "mailbox rule" applied, that is, that payments or notices deposited in the mail by the first of the month are timely. The Court of Appeals said not so, because the express language of the lease stated that the payment or notice had to be delivered by the first. In the Court's view, "delivered" clearly means "received by".

This lease was unusual, in that it was a month to month lease, and each additional month was considered an option, which the tenant could exercise only by notice or payment each month on or before the first. In Texas, as the Court notes, "(e)xercise of an option, unless excused in rare cases of equity, must be unqualified, unambiguous, and strictly in accordance with the terms of the agreement." Would the Court have decided differently if this had been a lease for a stated term and one of the monthly rent payments within the term was late? Very possibly so.

The landlord also argued that the tenant defaulted because the lease required that the payments or notices be sent registered or certified mail, and in this case the tenant's payment was sent regular mail. The tenant submitted evidence that payments had been sent via regular mail for 14 years. Based on this evidence, the Court found that the landlord had waived the lease provision requiring certified mail. Apparently all prior payments, even though sent by regular mail, were delivered on or before the first of the month, because there was no waiver argument by the tenant that the timing of the payment was waived by the landlord.

It's hard to imagine why a tenant would have agreed to so onerous a lease term in the first place! This case is yet another lesson for landlords and tenants that the lease means what it says.

As a Texas attorney representing Texas homeowner and property owner associations in residential and commercial developments, I find that very often the greatest service I can perform for my clients is education. I ran across a recent article by Richard Thompson with Regenesis in Realty Times, entitled the "HOA Health Survey". The article sets out a questionnaire to determine just how healthy your association is. The questionnaire contains very specific and pointed questions, and the answers will indeed tell you just how "healthy" your association is. Very interesting and informative article.

I have represented developers and investors in Texas real estate developments for over thirty years. I have been blessed with clients who are fabulous people to work with, and Texas development law is always challenging and interesting. There is one thing that is guaranteed to make both my clients and I tear our hair out however: arbitrary and capricious municipal governments and code enforcement personnel. They are not all that way, by any means: most Texas city government officials and personnel are highly professional. However, if you practice development law in Texas long enough, you will find that the few bad apples cause you more effort than all the others combined.

There is a game some municipal governments play called "Yes, that's what we promised then, but it's different now". The case of Continental Homes of Texas, L.P. v. City of San Antonio, decided recently by the Texas Fourth Court of Civil Appeals in San Antonio, illustrates what I mean. In 2002, the owners of a ranch, (located outside the San Antonio city limits but within its extra-territorial jurisdiction), received a "Vested Rights Permit" in return for giving the City a parcel of land for a gas metering station. The Permit had an effective date of 1991 and basically said that the ranch would be subject only to City ordinances and rules as of 1991, and not any passed thereafter. Importantly, the Permit had no expiration date.

In 2003, the City passed a Tree Preservation Ordinance, which required developers to, among other things, request a permit from the City Arborist before cutting trees, and to perform mitigation (i.e., plant new trees) if trees were going to be removed. In 2005, Continental bought part of the original ranch, and submitted a Master Development Plan to the City. The Plan was approved, but in a side letter, the City told Continental that Continental's Master Tree Stand Delineation was rejected, and further noted that the project will be subject to the City's Tree Preservation ordinance. In 2006, while Continental was clearing at the site, it was served with a temporary restraining order obtained by the City, stopping all work on the grounds that Continental was violating the Tree Preservation Ordinance.

The City argued that the Vested Rights Permit had become "dormant"! The trial court decided for the City. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision, and quite rightly held that the Vested Rights Permit controlled, and since the City's tree ordinance was passed after the date of the Vested Rights Permit, the tree ordinance did not apply to this property. Appropriately, the City had to pay Continental's attorney's fees. If I were a San Antonio taxpayer, I would be furious that my tax dollars financed a suit like this!

As a Texas real estate lawyer representing developers, builders and investors in Texas, I have found that my clients benefit from the availability of "alternate dispute resolution" remedies in their contracts. These remedies, such as mediation and arbitration, can result in satisfactory outcomes to disputes, without the cost of extended litigation. A recent Texas Supreme Court case illustrates that the contract remedy of arbitration can be waived, however.

In the case of Perry Homes, Inc. v. Robert and Jane Cull, the Culls sued their homebuilder for structural and drainage defects in the home built by Perry Homes. Initially, Perry Homes requested that the dispute be submitted to arbitration, but the Culls resisted. A ruling was never obtained by either party from the trial court on whether the case must be submitted to arbitration. The Culls then engaged in a course of extended (and expensive) discovery for 14 months. Four days before trial, the Culls requested that arbitration be ordered. The trial court ordered arbitration, and the arbitration resulted in an $800,000.00 award to the Culls.

The Texas Supreme Court states that: "(the Culls) got extensive discovery under one set of rules and then sought to arbitrate the case under another. They delayed disposition by switching to arbitration when trial was imminent and arbitration was not. They got the court to order discovery for them and then limited their opponents’ rights to appellate review. Such manipulation of litigation for one party’s advantage and another’s detriment is precisely the kind of inherent unfairness that constitutes prejudice under federal and state law." As a result,the Texas Supreme Court set aside the award, and sent the case back to the trial court for a trial, on the grounds that the Culls had waived their right to arbitrate this dispute.

While arbitration is often less expensive than discovery and trial, it has some downside: discovery and the scope of appeal is substantially limited in an arbitration proceeding. That's why it is faster and costs less. The moral here for clients and lawyers: the case should be analyzed in the beginning, to determine whether trial or arbitration is the best remedy. Once you embark down the path of discovery and trial, the arbitration door is going to swing shut!